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Rights of Audience - A Scottish Perspective
The Right Hon. Lord Rodger of Earlsferry*
It is an honour for me to have been asked to give the Child & Co. lecture. When
inviting me, Sir Nicholas Phillips suggested that any talk might relate to a difference
between procedures in England and Scotland. It seemed to me that some discussion
of rights of audience might be suitable, since the topic is not entirely free from
controversy and a speaker from a Scottish background might be able at least to
supplement your thinking on the subject.
First, a few words of introduction or elementary vocabulary for those contemplating
the mysteries of Scots Law for the first time. In Scotland we have solicitors who
correspond to solicitors in England and Wales. Advocates are the Scottish equivalent
of barristers and they are all members of the Scottish Bar or Faculty of Advocates.
Until the legislation on the Scottish legal profession in the Law Reform (Miscellaneous
Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1990 advocates had virtually exclusive rights of audience
before the Scottish supreme courts - the Court of Session in civil matters (including
appeals) and the High Court of Justiciary (hereafter the High Court) in criminal matters.
Similarly advocates had virtually exclusive rights of audience along with barristers
before the judicial committee of the House of Lords to which an appeal lies in civil
matters. 1 Even though Part II of the 1990 Act contained no new term for solicitors
who obtain rights of audience before the supreme courts, the Law Society's rules
approved by the Lord President of the Court of Session2 used the unlovely term
"solicitor advocate" and, while some advocates have protested about this terminology,
I suspect that it is here to stay and shall use it for the sake of convenience.
The second point to notice is perhaps somewhat ironical. While the controversy
over Scottish advocates' exclusive rights of audience had continued for at least as
long as that over barristers' rights,3 there is no doubt that the timing of the
introduction of the Scottish legislation in 1990 was determined by the introduction
*Lord Advocate. The Child & Co. Lecture 1993, published by arrangement with the Right Hon. Lord
Rodger and Child & Co.
I. For the detail see Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia of Scots Law Vol. 13 (Edinburgh 1993) para. 1325.
2. Eg. Code of Conduct (Scotland) Rules 1992, Rule 2(1). The Government's subordinate legislation
used the term "rights of audience solicitor" which does not exactly trip off the tongue. See ego Civil
Legal Aid (Scotland) Amendment Regulations 1993 (1993 S.1. No. 535).
3. For some of the background see A. Rodger, 'The Future of the Legal Profession in Scotland: Marching
to an Alien Tune?' (1991) 1.R. 1,6 et seq.
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of equivalent legislation for England and Wales following the breakdown of the Marre
Committee initiative. Once the legislation was passed the necessary steps were
completed fairly quickly in Scotland and the first solicitor advocates were admitted
in April and began to practise in May 1993.4 Those admitted have indeed appeared
before the Court of Session and High Court. All this happened at a time when the
English scheme was not yet in operation and still awaited the approval of the Heads
of Division. The result is that we in Scotland have some, though limited, experience
of the new system in operation.
The proposals to allow solicitors to acquire rights of audience in the supreme courts
of Scotland were not welcomed by the Faculty of Advocates. This is hardly surprising.
None the less it is fair to say - and it was noticed during the period of consultation
on the proposals and during their passage through Parliament - that the public approach
of the Scottish Bar was markedly different from that of the English Bar. The English
Bar, supported by some at the very highest levels of the judiciary, mounted a vociferous
campaign against the Lord Chancellor's proposals.s The tone of the Scottish Bar's
campaign against the Secretary of State for Scotland's proposals was rather different.
In their response to the Government's consultation pape~ they, of course, made clear
their opposition to what was proposed, but in that response and in most of the public
utterances of the Scottis~judges the rather apocalyptic tone adopted south of the Border
was missing.
There may have been many reasons for this, but one, I believe, was that certain
rather sweeping arguments which were strongly pressed in England and Wales could
simply not be put forward in Scotland because of the different way in which Scottish
solicitors had practised over the years. To bring out the difference we need to look
briefly at the historical position, even though any sketch must sacrifice a degree of
accuracy for brevity.
As I understand it,7 in England until the nineteenth century justice was mostly
centralised in the King's courts and the judges would hear cases, civil and criminal,
either at the centre in London or on circuit throughout the country. These courts
were serviced by barristers who would go on circuit with the judges. The position
was changed somewhat in 1846 when the County Courts Act for the first time
established a widespread system of local courts. The traditional organisation of the
Bar and its discipline based on the circuit system began to break down. At the same
time solicitors were given a right of audience in the new courts.
In Scotland by contrast there was an ancient system of local courts under a sheriff
4. Cf. (1993) 38 Journal of the Law Society of Scotland 208.
5. The flavour emerges pretty clearly from the debate in the House of Lords on 7 April 1989: Official
Report Fifth Series, House of Lards, Vol. 505 cols. 1307 et seq.
6. 771eLegal Profession in Scotland: A Consultation Paper (Scottish Home and Health Department. March
1989).
7. See e.g. A.H. Manchester, A Modern Legal History of England and Wales 1750-1950 (London. 1950)
Chapters 4-7. For the nineteenth century developments see especially R. Cocks, Foundations of the Modern
Bar (London. 1983).
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and his substitutes.8 These courts existed throughout Scotland and dealt with certain
categories of civil and criminal business. Although advocates had rights of audience
in these sheriff courts, in practice in the earlier part ofthe nineteenth century advocates
were not instructed very often since any additional cost of employing counsel could
not generally be recovered from the other side.9 The people who actually appeared
in the sheriff courts were procurators or agents - solicitors to use the modern term
- and originally only those agents attached to the particular sheriff court could practise
there. After 187310 agents could practise in any sheriff court in the country - a
reform which was considerably resented by the agents since it broke down their local
monopolies, while leaving the monopoly of the Faculty of Advocates before the
supreme courts untouched. It is also worth noticing that prosecutions in the sheriff
courts were conducted by procurators fiscal who were usually local agents and who
were appointed by the sheriff. Gradually the procurators fiscal came more and more
under the control of the Lord Advocate until in 1927 all appointments were vested
in him and they became full-time civil servants. I I
Even this very brief outline of the two systems is enough to bring out two points.
Whereas in England it was only in 1846 that local courts came to the fore, they had
always been important in Scotland and they had always been manned by agents or
solicitors. In civil matters this remained largely the case even after 1849 when clients
were allowed to recover the cost of counsel's fees if the court certified that the case
was appropriate for the employment of counsel. 12 What was found then is still found
today. Solicitors do a great deal of the routine work in the sheriff courts, including
the preparation of pleadings. On the other hand counsel are frequently asked to revise
pleadings, or to conduct legal debates or sheriff court proofs (ie trials) - though
it is still considered good manners for a solicitor to inform his opponent if counsel
has been instructed. In criminal matters the role of agents or solicitors was even more
marked. As we saw, the prosecutor, the procurator fiscal, would usually be a local
agent and he would conduct the proceedings on behalf of the Crown in the sheriff
court. Similarly, if the accused was represented, it would be by a local agent and
this became a major part of the work of many Scottish solicitors after the introduction
of criminal legal aid in 1964.13 Indeed counsel could not be employed in criminal
legal aid cases in the sheriff court without special sanction 14 and this was not too
readily given. It follows that, even before the recent legislation, solicitors could and
8. See An Introduction to Scottish Legal History (Stair Society. Edinburgh. 1958), Chaps. 25 and 26.
9. J. M'G]ashan, Practical Notes on the Jurisdiction and Forms of Process in Civil Cases of the Sheriff
Courts of Scotland (2nd edition, Edinburgh. ]842), para. 397.
10. Law Agents (Scotland) Act 1873, s.2.
1]. For an excellent account of the history see Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia Vol. 17 (Edinburgh, 1989),
paras. 530 et seq.
12. M'Glashan, Practical Notes (4th ed. by H. Barclay, Edinburgh, 1868), para. 439.
13. Legal Aid Act 1964.
14. Legal Aid (Scot]and) (Criminal Proceedings) Scheme 1975, Article 15(1)(b)(ii).
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did appear in the role of prosecutor and defending lawyer in all kinds of case before
the sheriff, whether it was before the sheriff alone or before the sheriff sitting with
a jury. Some of the cases would indeed be serious: where the sheriff sat with a jury,
he could impose a sentence of imprisonment of up to two years (raised to three years
in 1987) and he could remit the case to the High Court if a more severe sentence
was required.
When the matter of reform of rights of audience came to be discussed in Scotland
in 1989-1990, the background was therefore rather different from the background
in England and Wales, where, as I understand the position, the vast bulk of defended
criminal work was done by barristers. Scottish solicitors had long possessed, and
more importantly had exercised, very substantial rights of audience in both civil and
criminal cases. Unless, therefore, the Faculty of Advocates had been prepared to
assert that at least two centuries of Scottish legal history had been based on some
fundamental mistake, it was simply not possible for them to adopt the stance that
solicitors could not conduct cases properly and that only members of the Bar should
prosecute or defend significant cases. In the event the Faculty chose to argue in effeCt
that the work of the supreme courts was best conducted by a group of specialist pleaders
who devoted their whole time and attention to preparing and presenting cases in court
and who could therefore provide a better service to the Court. The supreme courts,
it was said, relied on that quality of service to operate at the level required of a supreme
court and moreover, it was argued, the use of specialist pleaders made for the more
efficient disposal of business. While this was effectively the same as the core argument
ofthe English Bar, the Faculty presented it in a different tone because of the different
background. It is doubtful whether the rather more black-and-white approach of the
English Bar was really any more effective in the end in persuading the Government,
the press or indeed the public.
You would not expect me to stray into the area of the discussion about rights of
audience for members of the Crown Prosecution Service in England and Wales. I
think that I am, however, entitled to mention the position of procurators fiscal in
Scotland. As I have explained, they prosecute day and daily in courts throughout
the country and in cases attracting significant terms of imprisonment. No-one would
suggest that every procurator fiscal is perfect, but it is self-evident that for the most
part they do the work well and I have no reason to believe that it would be done
better or more economically if counsel were employed.
It is sometimes argued that people employed full-time in a prosecution service would
not be able to bring the same standard of independence and objectivity to the conduct
of cases in court as do barristers, who appear one day for the prosecution and the
next for the defence. The position would inevitably be exacerbated, it is said, if the
person who prosecuted had taken any part in the investigation of the offence. The
Scottish experience does not bear this out. It is a matter of the ethos of the prosecuting
authority. With us every procurator fiscal is fiercely proud of his independent role:
it requires him to take decisions which he believes are right even though they may
not please the police or the judge before whom he appears. For instance every working
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day procurators fiscal and their deputes exercise their discretion in deciding whether
to institute proceedings or to abandon a case. So far from his superiors criticising
him or holding him back from promotion for taking a decision, say, to abandon
proceedings in an appropriate case, a procurator fiscal or his depute would be criticised
if he failed to do so.
While this approach pervades all levels of the Crown Office and the procurator
fiscal service, we have a particular - perhaps unique - mechanism to ensure that
it continues to prevail. At the very top of the system are thirteen Crown Counsel
or Advocate Deputes who are appointed personally by the Lord Advocate. They appear
for the Crown in the High Court and prosecute the most serious cases such as murder,
rape or armed robbery. Hitherto they have all been members of the Bar who usually
act as Advocate Deputes for about three years and then return to private practice.
Perhaps their position could be summarised in this way. Whereas in England and
Wales prosecuting counsel are instructed by the Crown Prosecution Service, in Scotland
Crown Counsel are commissioned by the Lord Advocate and give instructions to
the Procurator Fiscal Service. Because they are in post for only a short time, they
are not likely to become unduly prosecution-oriented. The crucial point is that these
Crown Counsel take all the decisions on whether to indict the more serious cases
and they also give instructions to procurators fiscal on hundreds of other points
throughout the year. These instructions must be followed by the procurators fiscal.
This ultimate element of independence is important, I believe, in preserving the
ethos of the Service and in maintaining public confidence in its independence. The
mere fact that certain procurators fiscal may now have rights of audience in the High
Court does not in any way undermine the argument in favour of having this team
of Crown Counsel drawn from outside as an ultimate safeguard of the independence
of the system. So, while I have announced 15 that, as a result of the changes in rights
of audience, in future I may appoint one of the Advocate Deputes from among the
solicitor advocate members ofthe Procurator Fiscal Service, I have stressed the need
for any such Advocate Depute to act in all respects in the same way as the Advocate
Deputes drawn from outside. Moreover, to ensure that Crown Counsel continue to
operate as they have done up until now, to begin with at least there will at most be
only one member of the team drawn from inside the Service who can be expected
therefore to absorb the particular atmosphere in which Crown Counsel work. Once
the scheme has been operating for a few years the Lord Advocate of the day can
decide whether this limit can safely be relaxed to any extent.
In summary then on the matter of prosecutors I would say that there is nothing
in our experience in Scotland which would lead me to accept any argument that
permanent members of a prosecution service are in principle incapable of conducting
prosecutions in an independent and objective way. They can do so. What is essential
is that they should be trained and required to act in this way. Providing that is done,
permanent members of a prosecuting service will be at least as vigilant as temporary
prosecutors in vindicating their high calling as ministers of justice.
15. Crown Office Staff Notice.
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If we turn now to the more general situation in Scotland, I can start by giving you
some statistics. There are at present 330 practising members of the Faculty of
Advocates, most of them based and living in Edinburgh but with a relatively small
but increasing number based and living in Glasgow, forty-four miles away. All
advocates have rights of audience in both the Court of Session and High Court, but
most tend to work predominantly in one or the other. As at January 1994 there are
in total 44 solicitor advocates, but unlike advocates they may choose to qualify for
rights of audience only in one branch or the other. Most have done so and accordingly
there are 34 solicitor advocates with criminal rights of audience only, 11 with civil
rights only and 1 with both. Solicitor advocates come from all over Scotland, but
fifteen of the thirty-four with criminal rights come from the west of Scotland where
many of the High Court trials take place, while seven of the eleven with civil rights
are from Edinburgh where the Court of Session is based.
Eight of those with criminal rights are members of the Procurator Fiscal Service.
There are another 26 solicitors in training at present and they are likely to be admitted
at the end of April 1994 bringing the total to 52. You will appreciate that even at
present the actual number of solicitor advocates is significant, being roughly 13%
of the number of practising advocates. A number of solicitor advocates have joined
together in an organisation known as Solicitor Advocate Services in order to provide
a point of contact through which solicitors may instruct them. These solicitor advocates
are therefore seeking to provide their instructing solicitors with a service which is
similar to that provided by advocates. It is therefore liable to be open to precisely
the same criticisms, e.g. that the solicitor advocates are unfamiliar with the case,
have not seen the client at an early stage or return instructions too late. We shall see.
In order to qualify for rights of audience solicitors must have had relevant court
experience for 5 years immediately before applying. 16 They also require to undergo
a course of training approved by the Lord President of the Court of Session. While
some more experienced solicitors can obtain exemption from certain elements of the
course, in broad outline they are required to attend a certain number of hearings of
the Court of Session or High Court, to sit an examination and to attend a course
organised by the Law Society of Scotland. I? They are then admitted at a special
ceremony in the Court of Session.
It is too early to judge what the lasting impact of the extension of rights of audience
will be, but it looks as if it will be considerable. Many of the pleas and procedural
matters are now being done by solicitor advocates who can easily fit in such appear-
ances, even if taking a particular trial might disrupt the rest of their business. But
they are also taking on the conduct of trials. For instanc~ I understand that in a High
Court sitting in Glasgow the accused or one of them was represented by a solicitor
advocate in about one-sixth of the cases. Two solicitor advocates have appeared in
16. Solicitors (Scotland) Act 1980 s.25A(2)(c) and Admission as a Solicitor with Extended Rights (Scotland)
Rules 1992, Rule 3(2)(b).
17. Admission as a Solicitor with Extended Rights (Scotland) Rules 1992, Parts III-VIII.
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effect as senior and junior in a murder trial. Crown Counsel report that some of the
solicitor advocates have been very good indeed, others less so. Perhaps that is just
what one would expect. The civil practitioners seem to have made less use so far
of their rights, but this may simply be because the opportunities are fewer and it
is noteworthy that some have appeared both at first instance and in the Inner House
of the Court of Session, the civil appeal court. One has conducted a judicial review.
Overall it appears that the legislation has had the effect of introducing a significant
degree of competition in the provision of representation in the supreme courts, though
the competition may consist more in the existence of an additional number of persons
who can take cases in the supreme courts rather than in the creation of a new rival
kind of service. In view of this competition advocates have complained that solicitors
who are solicitor advocates do not inform their clients that they could have the services
of counsel, if they preferred. It should be noticed, however, that the Law Society
Rules expressly cover this point and require any solicitor (which includes a solicitor
advocate) to explain all the relevant advantages and disadvantages of selecting a
particular solicitor advocate or counsel. IS
Even in the short time that the new rights have been operating, certain things have
become clear. The first is the need for codes of conduct and practice for both branches
of the profession to be revised to take account of the changed relationship between
them. While the legislation was going through Parliament, neither branch of the
profession took any steps in this respect. More surprisingly, even once the legislation
was passed, nothing was done. The Law Society of Scotland produced a code of
conduct, 19largely based on the Faculty's Code,20 but it did not deal with this matter.
The Faculty of Advocates kept an eye on the new training schemes in which some
advocates indeed acted as tutors, but they did not adjust their code of conduct on
this particular point.
The principal development occurred very quickly and came to a head during
Wimbledon Fortnight 1993 - hence earning the name by which it became known:
"mixed doubles". The very simplest set off acts is this. A solicitor instructs an advocate
to appear in the High Court or Court of Session along with a solicitor advocate, acting
either as the advocate's junior or, even more controversially, as his senior. At the
end of June the then Dean of Faculty issued a ruling21 which forbade counsel to
accept instructions to appear on this basis, although he indicated that some flexibility
might be permitted in certain cases. The Law Society of Scotland protested vigorously
against the ruling and the Director General of Fair Trading subsequently asked for
information about it.
Speaking for myself, I do not consider that it would be objectionable in principle
18. Code of Conduct (Scotland) Rules 1992, Rule 3. Whether the rule is always observed in practice
is, of course, another matter.
19. Code of Conduct (Scotland) Rules 1992, Sched.1.
20. Guide to the Professional Conduct of Advocates (1988) (Hereafter "Guide").
21. Dean's Ruling 29 June 1993: 'No advocate shall appear in any court, whether in a criminal or civil
cause, with a solicitor advocate instructed for the same client.'.
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for an advocate to be instructed by a solicitor to appear along with a solicitor advocate
since the solicitor advocate would simply be performing the role which would usually
be performed by another advocate. I have difficulty in seeing why it should be wrong
for an advocate to appear in this way along with another person who, Parliament
has said, is entitled to appear in the High Court or Court of Session. It seems to
me that, subject to one point, in these circumstances the relationship between the
advocate and the solicitor advocate should be much the same as that between two
counsel. That relationship is well understood but has not been spelled out in the Faculty's
Code of Conduct. The corresponding rules between an advocate and a solicitor advocate
would certainly need to be set out in formal terms in the codes governing the two
branches of the profession. Even if they were difficult to formulate in words, the
framing of such rules would not seem to give rise to any great difficulty of principle.
But the cases which actually provoked the Dean's ruling were different in an
important respect. What happened was that a solicitor advocate wished, qua solicitor,
to instruct an advocate to appear along with the self-same solicitor acting as a solicitor
advocate. It is fair to say, I think, that this particular set of circumstances was not
specifically envisaged when the legislation was introduced. In these cases the analysis
is very much more complicated since the two persons are really bound together in
two quite distinct relationships: the relationship between instructing solicitor and
counsel on the one hand; and on the other the relationship between two persons
appearing together in effect as counsel. It need hardly be said that the relationship
between an instructing solicitor and counsel is very different from that between counsel.
So, for instance, one might have the situation where the counsel A was the senior
and so prima facie entitled to tell his junior, the solicitor advocate, B, how the case
should be handled, while B, qua instructing solicitor, was entitled to sack A if he
disliked the line which was being adopted. The negotiation of fees between B, qua
instructing solicitor, and A's clerk would also raise sensitive issues, not least in
connexion with the proportion which B's fee qua solicitor advocate should bear to
A's fee as senior counsel.
While these are real problems, they are not necessarily insuperable. Indeed it seems
to me to be highly desirable even from the point of view of the Bar alone that they
should be solved in some way which does not debar advocates from this field of work.
The fact that certain clients are known to have wished to instruct an advocate and
a solicitor with rights of audience Oll t~is basis suggests that there is a market for
the provision of services in this way: Putting the same point slightly differently, it
would be unfortunate for members of the Bar ifthey could not accept such instructions
and earn the fees which the work would bring, especially if the result were that clients
in future chose to instruct two solicitor advocates instead. It is therefore good to know
that the Law Society of Scotland are apparently working on a possible set of rules
to deal with problems which undoubtedly exist.
I mentioned that there was one qualification to the proposition that there would
really be no difference between two advocates appearing together and an advocate
and a solicitor advocate appearing together instructed by another solicitor. The
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qualification is that if we have two advocates, then neither can speak to a lay
witness,22 whereas if we have an advocate and a solicitor advocate, the solicitor
advocate can,23 but the advocate cannot, speak to the witness. For this and other
reasons, the Faculty have argued that the advocate and the solicitor advocate are in
effect not operating on the famous level-playing field. This was indeed one of the
reasons why the Dean of Faculty condemned any arrangement for a counsel and a
solicitor advocate to appear together. The difficulty here results at least in part from
the Faculty's own rules of conduct.
The relevant aspect of the Faculty's rules is its "general rule ... that an advocate
should not interview or discuss a case with, or in the presence of, a potential
witness" ,24 the two usual exceptions being the client and an expert witness. 25
Solicitors are bound by no such rule. You will recognise the Faculty rule as being
broadly similar to that applied by the Bar Council, the first formalised version of
which was laid down in 1927.26 Dock briefs always constituted an exception to the
English version. Quite when the rule was adopted by the Scottish Bar is hard to
determine, since it was at one time a matter of pride for the Scottish Bar that decisions
on questions of conduct were neither published nor recorded.27 None the less we
can be sure that this was certainly not among the Faculty's most ancient rules. We
know this from an incident recorded by Dr Johnson's biographer, James Boswell,
who practised as an advocate in Edinburgh. 28In 1774 he agreed to defend a certain
John Reid on a charge of sheep-stealing. He tells us that on the Sunday evening before
the trial began29 he "examined separately two exculpatory witnesses as to his getting
the sheep (with the theft of which he was charged) from one Gardner. One of them
seemed so positive, notwithstanding my earnest request to tell me nothing but the
truth, that I began to give some credit to John's tale; but it afterwards appeared that
great endeavours had been used to procure false evidence". Boswell was the son
of ajudge and had been in practice for some years, and yet he apparently saw nothing
improper in interviewing these potential witnesses at home on a Sunday evening without
any agent being present. Admittedly his interviews appear to have done his client
no good, for he was hanged. Despite this unfortunate denouement, we must infer
from Boswell's account that the present rule came in at some later date. It is not
unlikely that the Scottish Bar took it over from England.
22. Guide. para. 9.2.4.1.
23. Code of Conduct (Scotland) Rules 1992, Sched. 2, para. 7(6).
24. Guide, nara. 9.2.4.1.
25. Guide. para. 9.2.4.2.
26. Annual Statement of the General Council of the Bar 1927, p.7. The latest version is contained in
the General Council's Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales Adopted by the Bar Council
27 January 1990, paras. 607 and 609.
27. Cf. Lord Clyde, 'The Profession of the Law' (1922) 38 Scottish Law Review I and 29 at 39.
28. See W. K. Winsatt, Jr., F. Pottle (eds.) Boswell for the Defence 1769-1774 (New York, Toronto,
London, 1959), entries between 15 July and 24 September 1774, pp. 227 et seq.
29. Gp. cit., entry for 31 July 1774, p.237.
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The justification for the rule is as difficult to pinpoint as its origin. The Code of
Conduct of the Faculty of Advocates says that the spirit of the rule is "that counsel
should not under any circumstances do or say anything which might suggest to the
witness that he should give evidence otherwise than in accordance with his honest
recollection or opinion" .30 But that certainly cannot have been the rationale of the
rule as originally adopted in England. In the early nineteenth century the 'rule was
that a barrister was not entitled to see either his client or a witness. The rule in that
extended form never seems to have applied to clients in Scotland - again we have
good evidence for that in Boswell who certainly sees clients and sometimes sees them
indeed without any agent being present.3\ The English rule against seeing clients in
criminal cases seems indeed to have lasted until about 1889 when Charles Russell
- the future Lord Chief Justice - saw Mrs Maybrick whom he was defending in
her famous trial for murder.32 (On this occasion the client was convicted, but was
in due course reprieved.) Yet the important thing to remember is that up until the
middle of the nineteenth century parties to a civil litigation were not allowed to give
evidence33 and a similar bar applied to accused persons until 189834 - so the part
of the English rule relating to clients could not have been intended to stop counsel
from infecting their evidence. It is therefore doubtful whether that was the explanation
of the emergence of the rule as it applied to witnesses. It is in any event rather unclear
why the Bar should think that discussions with counsel could be more dangerous
in infecting witnesses' evidence than conversations with the instructing solicitor. The
alternative rationale is that, by not speaking to the witnesses, counsel remain at one
remove and so take a more objective approach, which is of advantage to the
administration of justice as a whole.35 Even if that were a proper justification for
the rule today, it seems doubtful whether the rule was introduced to achieve this result ..
Certainly in the past there were suggestions that due to social vanity the Bar had
adopted a rule which operated not in the interests of barristers at all, but in the interests
of attorneys who, by restricting barristers' access to clients and witnesses, were able
to keep to themselves all the lucrative work involved in taking instructions from the
client and seeing the witnesses.
Whether true or not, those suggestions surfaced in the 1840s when the English
Bar felt under threat from the growing number of attorneys who had rights of audience
in the new County CourtS.36 In the face of this apparent threat of competition -
30. Guide, para. 9.2.4.4.
31. Op. cit. (note 28), entry for 15 July 1774 when compared with the entry for 30 July 1774, p. 236
init. See also the entries for 14 July and 13 August 1774 relating to Lady Dundonald.
32. E. B. Rowlands. 'The Etiquette of the Bar', (1895) 100 The Law Times 107 at p. 108 (first column).
33. The rule was abolished in England and Wales by s.2 of the Evidence Act 1851 and in Scotland by
s.3 of the Evidence (Scotland) Act 1853.
34. Criminal Evidence Act 1898, s.1 which applied to both England and Wales and Scotland.
35. Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia Vol. 13, para. 1357; Rowlands, 100 The Law Times 107-108.
36. 'The Etiquette of the English Bar: A Barrister's Grumble' (1898) 104 The Law Times 546.
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which seems to have been not dissimilar to the threat of competition now facing Scottish
advocates - some barristers at least argued that the Bar would be handicapped by
those rules of etiquette which prevented them from seeing clients or witnessesY
Happily the level playing-field had not yet been invented, and so that metaphor was
not invoked, but the sentiment was the same: it was not fair that barristers should
have to compete with attorneys whose rules of conduct allowed them to see clients
and witnesses in a way in which barristers could not. Barristers should therefore
dispense with the rules of etiquette which really in effect worked only to protect
attorneys.
As we know, that view did not prevail, though the fact that the Bar Council was
asked for a ruling on the position on witnesses as late as 192738 suggests that some
barristers may have been unhappy with the position even then. From time to time
some advocates have questioned the strict application of the rule - especially as it
could seem to prevent them taking on minor sheriff court cases where the client did
not wish to pay for both a solicitor and an advocate.39 It is probably the case,
however, that most Court of Session judges support the application of the existing
rule to advocates in the supreme courts - because of the element of independence
which it is thought to preserve. Yet such a rule has never been applied to solicitors
when appearing in the sheriff courts and Parliament was not persuaded that it should
be applied to them in the higher courts either. We therefore have two different rules
of conduct applying to advocates and solicitor advocates in the supreme courts. While
this may seem strange, it is essentially an extension of the practice in the sheriff court
and Parliament was well aware of what would happen in the supreme courts once
the legislation came into effect. Parliament left the matter to the professional bodies
and to the Court and so any changes in the rules in the light of experience gained
in working in the new circumstances would be a matter entirely for them; the
Government would not be involved.
Even if for some reason the Faculty came to question whether there was a sufficient
ethical basis for the existing rule on speaking to witnesses,4o they would probably
think twice before altering it since the practice of advocates or barristers not seeing
witnesses can be defended on less lofty but very practical grounds which may well
have been behind the continued existence of the rule. Advocates and barristers are
able to concentrate on appearing in court, advising on the preparation of cases and
giving opinions precisely because they do not spend their time seeing witnesses and
taking statements from them or from clients. If advocates or barristers did these things,
37. Loc. cit.
38. Annual Statement oflhe General Council of the Bar 1927. p.7. J. E. Singleton, Conduct at Ihe Bar
(London, 1933), pp.8 and 14 el seq. does little to explain the purpose of the rule.
39. Such a question lay behind the Note by Dean to Advocates' Clerks 9 February 1977 on appearances
by counsel without solicitors. See Swir Memorial Enclyclopaedia Vol. 13, para. 1347. The Dean in question
was the future Lord Mackay of Clash fern .
40. The Chainnan of the English Bar has recently indicated that such rules of conduct may need to be examined.
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then they would be indistinguishable from solicitors and would not be able to provide
the distinctive kinds of services which solicitors and their clients value. They would
also have to set up offices of exactly the same kinds as solicitors with all the attendant
overheads. So while an inability to speak to witnesses may be seen in a certain light
as a competitive disadvantage, it surely carries with it the important corresponding
competitive advantage that the advocate or barrister can offer a particular service
without the distraction of dealing constantly with clients and witnesses and without
the attendant overheads. A rule which secures the continuance of this type of legal
practice can be defended on this basis. In any event the restrictions on advocates
seeing clients and witnesses may have comparatively little practical significance in
relation to competition with those solicitor advocates who are making themselves
available for instruction by other solicitors. In such cases the instructing solicitor
will usually have seen the witnesses and the solicitor advocate will be expected to
see the client only in the presence of the instructing solicitor. 41 So the position of
advocates and solicitor advocates acting on this basis may not be so very different
- which reinforces the point that they are simply another group of practitioners offering
the same kind of service as advocates.
In drawing these remarks to a close I am only too conscious that this has been
a rather parochial discussion and that in particular I have omitted all mention of the
possible far-reaching implications of the provisions of European law on lawyers'
services and rights of establishment. Apart from post-Maastricht fatigue my only
excuse can be that the possible emergence of an establishment directive means that
these aspects are very much in flux. I have no doubt that change will come from
that quarter too, but in the meantime we in Scotland look forward to watching, and
learning from, what happens in England and Wales when the reforms in the Courts
and Legal Services Act finally come to pass.42
41. Code of Conduct (Scotland) Rules 1992, Sched. 2, para 3(4) and (5).
42.1 am grateful to Mr Alan Maxwell of the Lord Advocate's Department, Mrs Pat Lawlerofthe Faculty
of Advocates and Mr Bruce Ritchie of the Law Society for assistance in preparing the revised text of
the lecture. It was not possible to take account of developments since January 1994.
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